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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
difference between the two laws is that the unconstitutional one provided
for "readjustment," while the valid law spoke of "composition," thereby
emphasizing the voluntary or consent aspect of the law. But the Supreme
Court went out of its way to say that consent by the state has nothing
to do with the law's validity.
In view of the fact that the Court did not place its holding in the in-
stant case on either of the two grounds of difference between the statutes,
it would seem that the Court has reversed itself and, in effect, adopted the
view of Mr. Justice Cardozo in the Ashton case. A new emphasis upon the
need for relieving the states of the burden of their obligations and the
changed composition of the Court would seem to account for the changed
attitude. W. B. M.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCF---LIABILITY OF AUTOmOBILE DEALER FOR DEFECTS IN
DEMONSTRATOR CAR-[Missouri].-Defendant automobile dealer lent a car
to a prospective purchaser for the purpose of a demonstration. While the
latter was taking his wife for a drive, an accident occurred in which the
wife was injured. She sued the dealer, alleging that the accident was due
to defective brakes, caused by the seepage of grease from the wheel bear-
ings on to the brake lining. Held, plaintiff could not recover, there being
no evidence that the dealer had not made a reasonable inspection.1
In reaching its decision the court adopted the rule as to the liability of
a vendor of a chattel, seemingly on the assumption that there was a sale.2
In general, the vendor of a chattel is under no duty to test articles manu-
factured or packed by others for the purpose of discovering latent defects
and is not liable for injuries resulting from such defects unless he has
actual knowledge thereof.3 The rule has been qualified by two exceptions
in which the vendor is under a duty to make a reasonable inspection: (1)
where there is something which reasonably tends to call attention to pos-
sible defects;4 and (2) where the article being sold is such as becomes
dangerous through defects. 5 The court in the instant case held that the
dealer owed some duty of inspection to the plaintiff because the article
being sold was unusually complicated, thus in effect placing the instant case
within the second exception noted.
1. Shroder v. Baron Dady Motor Co. (Mo. 1937) 111 S. W. (2d) 66.
2. See also Tourte v. Horton Mfg. Co. (1930) 99 Cal. App. 795, 290 Pac.
919, where the court applied the sale theory in determining the vendor's
duty toward a prospective purchaser of a washing machine.
3. Tourte v. Horton Mfg. Co. (1930) 99 Cal. App. 795, 290 Pac. 919;
Craig v. Baker & Holmes Co. (1923) 85 Fla. 373, 96 So. 93; Segal v. Carrol
Furniture Co. (1935) 51 Ga. App. 191, 179 S. E. 775; Peaslee-Gaulbert Co.
v. McMath's Adm'r (1912) 148 Ky. 265, 146 S. W. 770, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.)
465, Ann. Cases 1913E 392; Simons v. Sun Ray Motor Co. (Sup. Ct. 1917)
162 N. Y. S. 968.
4. King Hardware Co. v. Ennis (1929) 39 Ga. App. 355, 147 S. E. 1190;
see Restatement, Torts (1934) sec. 402.
5. King Hardware Co. v. Ennis (1929) 39 Ga. App. 355, 147 S. E. 1190;
Peaslee-Gaulbert Co. v. McMath's Adm'r (1912) 148 Ky. 265, 146 S. W.
770, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 465, Ann. Cases 1913E 392.
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The automobile which was delivered by the defendant dealer to the plain-
tiff's husband was to be used for demonstration purposes only. The parties
did not contemplate the sale of this demonstrator. Therefore the car actu-
ally involved was not the subject of a sale or a proposed sale.0 Under
circumstances similar to the instant case, although not involving the lia-
bility of a dealer for latent defects, it was held that the relationship be-
tween an automobile dealer and a prospective purchaser driving the former's
car is one of bailor-bailee. 7 So when a dealer leaves goods with a prospec-
tive purchaser for examination, a bailment for mutual benefit is estab-
lished.8 A bailor owes the bailee the duty to inform him of defects which
are, or reasonably should be, known to the bailor 0 Since the court in the
instant case found that the defendant made a reasonable inspection, he
would not have been liable even on the bailment theory. It is submitted,
however, that the court's decision would have been technically sounder had
the bailment theory been adhered to.10 E. M. S.
TORTS-RADIO DEFAMATION-PRIVILEGE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS-[Ore-
gon].-During the broadcast of a murder trial the defendant's counsel said
that a witness for the state "was not truthful and was lower than a rattle-
snake because a rattlesnake gives warning before it strikes." That witness
brought an action of libel against the counsel who made the statements,
the judge who presided over the criminal trial, and the radio station on
the theory that the broadcast permitted by the trial judge was unlawful
and that, by reason of the untruths and malice in the statements, all the
defendants participating in that wrongful act were joint tortfeasors.
The judge was held free from liability.1 In both England2 and the
United States,3 because of public policy, a judge is absolutely privileged
as to defamatory statements in the course of judicial proceedings, 4 even
6. In Tourte v. Horton Mfg. Co. (1930) 99 Cal. App. 795, 290 Pac. 919,
cited supra note 2, there was a possibility of a sale of the particular wash-
ing machine. Therefore that case can be distinguished from the instant
case.
7. Harris v. Whitehall (1936) 55 Ga. App. 130, 189 S. E. 392; Hamp v.
Universal Auto Co. (1933) 173 Wash. 585, 24 P. (2d) 77.
8. Israel v. Uhr (Sup. Ct. 1917) 164 N. Y. S. 50.
9. Goddard, Outlines of the Law of Bailments and Carriers (2nd ed.
1928) 20, sec. 20.
10. In the Restatement, Torts (1934) sec. 388, the liability of a supplier
of a chattel is discussed. In the comment thereunder, it is stated that the
rule as to a supplier of a chattel is applicable to cases of bailment. Since
the instant case is strictly one of a bailment, this section might have been
applied by the court in the instant case. Instead, the court quoted from
sec. 402, which deals with the liability of a vendor of a chattel.
1. Irwin v. Ashurst (Ore. 1938) 74 P. (2d) 1127.
2. Scott v. Stansfield (1868) L. R. 3 Ex. 220; Law v. Llewellyn (1906)
1 I. B. 487, 75 L. J. K. B. 320, 94 L. T. 359; Newell, Slander and Libel
(4th ed. 1924) sec. 360.
3. Mundy v. MacDonald (1921) 216 Mich. 444, 185 N. W. 877; Young
v. Moore (1922) 29 Ga. App. 73, 113 S. E. 701.
4. Douglas v. Collins (1934) 152 Misc. 839, 273 N. Y. S. 663, in which
defamatory statements made by a judge, after he had adjourned the case,
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